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Abstract
This article engages the narrative of fragmentation in inter-
national law by asserting that legal academics and profes-
sionals have failed to probe more deeply into ‘fragmen-
tation’ as a concept and, more specifically, as a spatial
metaphor. The contention here is that however central frag-
mentation has been to analyses of contemporary interna-
tional law, this notion has been conceptually assumed, ahis-
torically accepted and philosophically under-examined. The
‘fragment’ metaphor is tied historically to a cartographic
rationality – and thus ‘reality’ – of all social space being
reducible to a geometric object and, correspondingly, a pla-
nimetric map. The purpose of this article is to generate an
appreciation among international lawyers that the problem
of ‘fragmentation’ is more deeply rooted in epistemology
and conceptual history. This requires an explanation of how
the conflation of social space with planimetric reduction
came to be constructed historically and used politically, and
how that model informs representations of legal practices
and perceptions of ‘international legal order’ as an inherent-
ly absolute and geometric. This implies the need to dig up
and expose background assumptions that have been work-
ing to precondition a ‘fragmented’ characterization of
worldly space. With the metaphor of ‘digging’ in mind, I
draw upon Michel Foucault’s ‘archaeology of knowledge’
and, specifically, his assertion that epochal ideas are
grounded by layers of ‘obscure knowledge’ that initially
seem unrelated to a discourse. In the case of the fragmenta-
tion narrative, I argue obscure but key layers can be found
in the Cartesian paradigm of space as a geometric object
and the modern States’ imperative to assert (geographic)
jurisdiction. To support this claim, I attempt to excavate the
fragment metaphor by discussing key developments that led
to the production and projection of geometric and planimet-
ric reality since the 16th century.
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Perceptions of space have been integral to the construal
of social life, and further a defining preoccupation in
modern western thought. The various ways social space
has been conceived and represented across time, civili-
zations and cultures served to precondition and orient
historical perceptions of the actual, the possible and the
imaginable.1 In this way, the significance of space
extends well beyond the mere cosmological and shapes
the very constitution of what we think we know about
our social existence. This could explain why considera-
ble significance and anxiety has been attached historical-
ly to spatial representations of the known ‘community’,2
‘world’ or ‘universe’.
The field of international law has been no less removed
from this historical preoccupation as contemporary
scholars and professionals have been similarly engaged
with the issue of international law’s underlying spatial
character. The terms of that engagement depart from a
foundational teleology, which asserts international law
to be a ‘unity’,3 and the proliferation of specialised nor-
mative and institutional regimes potentially alter that
imperative ‘coherence’. Unsurprisingly, voices from the
legal world have raised anxiety about this unitary
essence being somehow upended, a tension expressed
through the now familiar narrative of ‘fragmentation’.
The notion of fragmentation in international law dé-
buted as a plot of ‘danger’4 concerned with how the
Westphalian order of ejus regio, cujus religio, systema-
tised as ‘international law’ in the 19th and 20th centu-
ries, became threatened by overlapping – and sometimes
competing – global ‘regimes’ (e.g. human rights law,
trade law) that enjoyed autonomy over their e.g. ‘frag-
ments’, ‘islands’ or ‘particles’ of normative and institu-
tional activity. This concern revealed itself to be more
than an academic issue as it drew the attention of the
International Law Commission (ILC), and precipitated
the 2006 Report of the Study Group of the International
Law Commission on ‘The Fragmentation of Interna-
tional Law’ (ILC Report), chaired by Martti Koskennie-
1. See R. Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History,
Spacing Concepts (2002).
2. See B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins
and Spread of Nationalism (1991).
3. G. Guillaume, ‘The Future of International Judicial Institutions’, 44 Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly 848, at 849 (1995).
4. Sir Robert Y. Jennings, ‘The Role of the International Court of Justice’,
68 British Yearbook of International Law 1, at 60 (1997).
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mi. The ILC Report became a pivotal intervention
owing to how it re-framed what ‘fragmentation’ meant
as a disciplinary and vocational term of art. Specifically,
the Report’s assessment transformed an initial percep-
tion of threat into an understanding of fragmentation as
consistent with the relative coherence of international
law:
…The move from a world fragmented into sovereign
States to a world fragmented into specialized
‘regimes’ may in fact not at all require a fundamental
transformation of public international law – though it
may call for imaginative uses of its traditional techni-
ques. There were always States that regarded inter-
national law as incompatible with their sovereignty.
Similarly, there may today exist global regimes or
rule-complexes that feel international law an alien
intrusion…. If international law is needed as a struc-
ture for coordination and cooperation between (sov-
ereign) States, it is no less needed in order to coordi-
nate and organize the cooperation of (autonomous)
rule-complexes and institutions.5
Thus, with the ILC Report’s re-characterisation the
notion of fragmentation became repackaged with the
trappings of new and old; global ‘regimes’ moved from a
categorisation of counter-teleological to epiphenomenal
of international law’s underlying spatial rationality. In
this new light, fragmentation became less about radical
transformation and more a case of trans-historical con-
tinuity and spatial reproduction. This did not imply
vocational upheaval or require epistemic reflection, but
instead re-working a familiar ‘structure for coordination
and cooperation’ inherited from antecedent fragmenta-
tion, nominally known as territorial or state sovereignty.
In systemic terms, a re-cast fragmentation offered the
prospect of renewal for an international legal status quo,
which otherwise faced a prospect of having to profound-
ly re-examine its teleological perception of space. The
ILC’s authoritative intervention reset the terms of the
narrative by turning to ‘problem-solving’6: the task of
legal scholars and professionals was to re-invent ways
their ‘coherent legal-professional technique’ could be
projected upon fragmentation’s latest iteration. Put
somewhat differently, the expert scripting of the ILC
Report reconstituted change into continuity, polemic
into phenomenon, and, finally, presented reification as a
remedial substitute for disciplinary and vocational
reflexivity.
With that discursive context in mind, this article en-
gages the unity/fragmentation polemic with a markedly
different focus from the frame and imperative that the
ILC Report established, and which many subsequent
5. ILC Study Group, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties aris-
ing from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report
of the Study Group of the International Law Commission finalised by
Martti Koskenniemi (A/CN.4/L.682 and Corr. 1), at 246 (2006).
6. A social role and restriction well discussed by Martti Koskenniemi, see
From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument
(1989), at 8-10.
works have followed in varying degrees and nuances.7
The intention is not to further what has become a pro-
tracted discussion on fragmentation as an institutional
‘phenomenon’ or advance a discourse that treats frag-
mentation as an ‘object’ for coherence-making, ‘regime
interaction’8 or even constitutionalisation.9 Instead, this
article asks the reader to take a step back and direct his
or her attention at the curiously forgone aspect of the
analysis on fragmentation: how legal academics and pro-
fessionals have failed to probe more deeply into ‘frag-
mentation’ as a concept and, more specifically, as a spa-
tial metaphor.10
The contention here is that however central fragmenta-
tion has been to analyses of contemporary international
law, this notion has been conceptually assumed, ahistor-
ically accepted and philosophically under-examined.
The metaphor of the ‘fragment’ comes with an intellec-
tual and historical baggage to which legal usage is not
impervious and in many respects seems predicated
upon. Foremost, the manner in which fragments have
been used to characterise or map the ‘legal world’
appears aligned with certain geometric assumptions
about space that derive from Cartesian philosophy. Fur-
ther still, the parallels drawn between territorial and
‘regime’ fragmentation seem to ignore the legacy of con-
quest and domination that the former represents. In this
way, speaking about international legal space via the
metaphor of the fragment implicates the epistemologi-
cal, geometric and imperial heritage of scientific positi-
vism; and how this together shaped a cartographic
rationality – and thus ‘reality’ – of all social space being
reducible to a geometric object and, correspondingly, a
planimetric map. This is at best a 17th century Cartesi-
an mindset ill-equipped to cope with the more variable
spatial practices and dimensions of contemporary law
beyond the state.
The purpose of this article, therefore, is to generate an
appreciation among international lawyers that the prob-
lem of ‘fragmentation’ is more deeply rooted in episte-
mology and conceptualisation than it is a reified
‘phenomenon’. To do so, understanding needs to be
cultivated, which makes clear that the unity/fragmenta-
tion discussion relies on an implicit but no less ques-
tionable presumption: social and legal practices are ulti-
mately related and reducible to a geometric area. This
requires an explanation of how the conflation of social
7. E.g. C. Binder, ‘Stability and Change in Times of Fragmentation: The
Limits of Pacta Sunt Servanda Revisited’, 25 Leiden Journal of Interna-
tional Law 4 (2012); S. Schill, ‘W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Litera-
ture and Sociology of International Investment Law’, 22 European Jour-
nal of International Law 3 (2011); I. Buffard et al. (eds.) International
Law between Universalism and Fragmentation (2008); M. Koskennie-
mi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Poli-
tics’, 70 Modern Law Review 1 (2007); M. Prost, ‘All Shouting the
Same Slogans: International Law’s Unities and the Politics of Fragmen-
tation’, 17 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 1 (2006).
8. See M. Young (ed.), Regime Interaction in International Law: Facing
Fragmentation (2012).
9. See G. Teubner, Constitutional Fragments (2012).
10. For valuable discussion on the relationship between metaphors and
concepts see: N.G. Onuf, ‘Fitting Metaphors’, in N.G. Onuf (ed.), Mak-
ing Sense, Making Worlds (2013), at 40-50.
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space with planimetric reduction came to be constructed
historically and used politically, and how that model
informs representations of legal practices and percep-
tions of ‘international legal order’ as an inherently abso-
lute and geometric. What this implies is the need to dig
up and expose background assumptions that have been
working to precondition the fragmentation narrative.
With the metaphor of ‘digging’ in mind, I draw upon
Michel Foucault’s ‘archaeology of knowledge’ and, spe-
cifically, his assertion that epochal ideas are grounded
by layers of ‘obscure knowledge’ that initially seem
unrelated to a discourse. In the case of the fragmenta-
tion narrative (or ‘discourse’ – to use Foucauldian lan-
guage), I argue obscure but key layers can be found in
the Cartesian paradigm of space as a geometric object
and the modern States’ imperative to establish (geo-
graphic) jurisdiction. To support this claim, I try to
excavate the fragment metaphor by discussing key
developments that led to the production and projection
of geometric and planimetric reality since the 16th cen-
tury. Subsequently, I relate that legacy of scientific
thought to the contemporary work of both Gunther
Teubner and Martti Koskenniemi, identifying the lega-
cies of geometric science, which may linger in present
articulations of international legal practice. To conclude
the article, I return to the value of Foucault’s ‘archaeol-
ogy’ and how it adds to our reading of the fragmentation
narrative by uncovering the presumption of geometric
space and mapping. Finally, I underline how the prob-
lem of ‘fragmentation’ in international law is more epis-
temic than initially thought, and how the unquestioned
use of a geometric metaphor has discreetly bound the
articulation of international legal practices to a carto-
graphic and planimetric legacy that historically served
the interests of power and domination.
1. What is a Fragment?
Foucault and Excavating
Systems of Thought
Michel Foucault was an historian of ideas, but he was
explicit in his aim to constitute a different approach to
the study of such history.11 Broadly stated, Foucault’s
concern was with the history of discourses and specifi-
cally the manner in which they sanctioned knowledge-
claims and practices in the human sciences.12 He devel-
oped through the various phases of his scholarship
distinctive concepts for the analysis of discourses, such
as ‘archaeology’, ‘genealogy’ and ‘problematisation’.13
For the purposes of this paper it is the first concept that
interests us. But before we enter Foucault’s archaeologi-
cal conception, it is important to underline the signifi-
11. M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (2002), at 4.
12. M. Philip, ‘Michel Foucault’, in Q. Skinner (ed.), The Return of Grand
Theory in the Human Sciences (1985), at 67.
13. T. Flynn, ‘Foucault’s Mapping of History’, in Gary Gutting (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Foucault, 2nd ed. (2005), at 29.
cance Foucault attached to a discourse and how it con-
stituted a ‘system of thought’.14 Foucault was conscious
to emphasise this point in his preface to The Order of
Things, the monograph that set out his archaeology:
This book first arose out of a passage of Borges, out
of the laughter that shattered, as I read the passage,
all the familiar landmarks of my thought – our
thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age
and our geography – breaking up all the ordered sur-
faces and all the planes with which we are accus-
tomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things,
and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threat-
en with collapse our age-old distinction between the
Same and the Other. This passage quotes a ‘certain
Chinese encyclopaedia’ in which it is written that
‘animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emper-
or, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e)
sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the
present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable,
(k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et
cetera.... In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the
thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that,
by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic
charm of another system of thought, is the limitation
of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that.15
Thus, for Foucault, the study of discourses was about
uncovering the limits of possible knowledge in a given
culture and at a given moment through archaeology.16
Yet, Foucault used the term ‘archaeology’ at slight var-
iance from its conventional connotation.17 He did sub-
scribe to archaeology being about digging up and recon-
structing the past, but his ‘archaeology of knowledge’
was more ideational since it sought to reconstitute the
buried rules and assumptions that defined the ‘condi-
tions of existence’ for a system of thought or discourse.
As Barry Smart explains:
The object of archaeological analysis [was] then a
description of...literally what may be spoken of in a
discourse; what statements survive, disappear, get re-
used, repressed or censured; which terms are recog-
nized as valid, questionable, invalid; what relations
exist between ‘the system of present statements’ and
those of the past....18
This latter question of wanting to examine associations
between systems of present and past statements proves
valuable, I argue, when looking at the fragmentation
narrative, as we should expect that how national (west-
ern) lawyers conceive space is likely influenced by an
intellectual background and specifically international
14. Ibid., at 70.
15. M. Foucault, The Order of Things (1994), at xv.
16. Ibid., at 168.
17. Foucault, supra n. 11, at 151.
18. B. Smart, Michel Foucault: Revised Edition (2002), at 48.
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law’s embeddedness within modern western thought.19
International law has never been a social island, but
rather its constitution as a discipline, vocation and even
project was intertwined with the development of
modern European thought. One need only think of a
few authors as examples of that intersection, such as
Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Rousseau, Locke, Kant or
Bentham; and failing the appropriation of a strict func-
tionalist optic it proves a frustrating exercise to try and
convincingly separate one from the other. As Martti
Koskenniemi observed in his study of early international
law historiographies, even the first formal 19th century
texts which emerged on the history of international law
flatly assumed that ‘the history of international law sim-
ply was the history of humanity’.20
It is this re-situating of international law and the frag-
mentation narrative within – metaphorically speaking –
the deeper terrain and heritage of modern thought,
which, I contend, makes Foucault’s archaeology a rele-
vant perspective of analysis. It opens us to thinking
about the unity/fragmentation dichotomy both in terms
of excavation and, crucially, to the value of uncovering
discursive antecedents that sit as layers beneath this
apparent problematic. In other words, re-conceptualis-
ing the fragmentation narrative as a site for excavation
engenders us, much like material archaeologists, to
exhume those discursive artefacts, which could tell us
more about how things came to be conceptually built
and perceived over time and through to the present. In
particular, what were the conditions that enabled the
‘international legal order’ to be expressed with the meta-
phors and language of ‘fragments’ and wholes? Or, to
draw from Foucault’s phrasing in the earlier quoted
preface: how did it become possible to think of the frag-
ment as a ‘familiar landmark’ rather than as an ‘exotic’
criterion from an unfamiliar ‘Chinese’ taxonomy?
One of the explanations why the term ‘fragment’ eludes
conceptual probing might pertain to the resonant mate-
riality it conveys to a disciplinary/vocational audience
convinced by its own concreteness. There are two steps
to this point. The first relates to what social constructi-
vists refer to as the mutual constitution of the subject
and object: what we believe to be the world ‘out there’ is
in no small measure defined by our social beliefs and
constructs, rather than simply given by ‘nature’.21 This,
in turn, feeds into a related observation that internation-
al lawyers have claimed epistemological and ontological
certainty through a kind of ‘common sense’ empiricism:
the concreteness of their disciplinary/vocational world
is demonstrated by pointing to the materiality of trea-
19. Considerable scholarship has emerged on the contribution of Foucault’s
work toward the analysis of international law, see: B. Golder, P. Fitz-
patrick, Foucault’s Law (2009); A. Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, 25
Leiden Journal of International Law 609 (2012).
20. M. Koskenniemi, ‘Law, Teleology and International Relations: An Essay
in Counterdisciplinarity’, 26 International Relations 1, at 4 (2012).
21. See F. Kratochwil, ‘Constructivism: what it is (not) and how it matters’,
in D. Della Porta and M. Keating (eds.), Approaches and Methodologies
in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective (2008), at 82. See also:
J.W. Davis, Terms of Inquiry: On the Theory and Practice of Political
Science (2005), at 10-60.
ties, cases, courts and clients.22 In this light, the use of
the term ‘fragment’ becomes a quaint fit for a disciplina-
ry and vocational identity assured by images of the tan-
gible.
However, there is something greater taking place when
the term ‘fragment’ is adopted by international legal
vocabulary and it becomes clearer the more we ‘dig’ into
the idea of a fragment as Foucault’s archaeology tells us
to. What am I getting at? Let us start to excavate by ask-
ing the simple but no less overlooked question of ‘what
is a fragment?’ Our first impulse is to survey regular and
technical dictionaries for a definition and perhaps an
etymology. As with most trips to the dictionary, the
quest for epistemological and ontological certainty is
never successfully found. A fragment is generally
defined as a piece or component separated from an orig-
inal whole,23 and derives from the Latin root frangere,
which means ‘to break into pieces’. For many, the inqui-
ry stops there because the spatial explanation appears
both ‘natural’ and every day; no doubt facilitated by dic-
tionary examples that use an exploding bomb to illus-
trate what a ‘fragment’ is.24 Yet, for others, this appa-
rent naturalness, as presented through the binary of
component and whole, is actually a linguistic marker of
how the concept and meaning of a fragment derivates
from a more profound conceptual heritage and in fact a
scientific legacy.
2. The Transcendental (Sense)
of Fragmentation?
This shift toward conceptual excavation is not an intui-
tive move for many (international) lawyers, and espe-
cially in light of how conventional legal education has
worked to form a professional ethos25 firmly grounded
and focused upon ‘solving problems’. In this way, the
identity of working with and thinking about the law has
not typically involved an examination of conceptual his-
tories in any profound sense, but rather dealing with
reified ‘phenomena’ that are taken – on the basis of
asserted relevance – to constitute an autonomous pres-
ent.26
22. M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Tech-
nique and Politics’, 70 Modern Law Review 1, at 1-2 (2007).
23. A “fragment” is defined by The New Oxford Dictionary of English as:
“A small part broken or separated off something.”
24. A “fragment” is defined by the McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific
and Technical Terms as: “A piece of an exploding or exploded bomb,
projectile, or the like.”
25. See M. Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos
of Legal Education’, 1 European Journal of Legal Studies 1, at 14-18
(2007).
26. Koskenniemi has discussed this in the relation between “crude pragma-
tism” and “indeterminate theorizing”. See: From Apology to Utopia, at
XV-XVI. The perspective of historical sociology in International Relations
also provides a valuable discussion of problem-solving in an “autono-
mous present”. See S. Hobden and J. Hobson (eds.), Historical Sociolo-
gy of International Relations (2002).
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Yet, it would be misleading to say that conceptual scru-
tiny has been absent from the legal academy. This
would ignore, for one, the sizable heritage and contribu-
tion of legal realist scholarship that made its mark in the
early 20th century. While not a systemic jurisprudence,
legal realism amounted to a conceptual awakening that
challenged the presentation of legal doctrines and
assumptions as being natural, pre-existing and thus dis-
tinguishable from the social and political worlds.27 As
Felix S. Cohen aptly reminded his contemporaries and
those that followed:
[...] When the vivid fictions and metaphors of tradi-
tional jurisprudence are thought of as reasons for
decisions, rather than poetical or mnemonic devices
for formulating decisions reached on other grounds,
then the author, as well as the reader, of the opinion
or argument, is apt to forget the social forces which
mold the law and the social ideals by which the law is
to be judged. [...]28
Curiously, the conceptual acumen that Cohen exempli-
fied as a hallmark of contemporary legal thought seems
missing when observing an international legal scholar-
ship entwined with the vocabulary of fragmentation.
The list of journal articles and edited volumes dedicated
to the term grow, and fragmentation has reached such
acceptance that its use transcends across ‘methodologi-
cal lines’ in international legal academia.29 It even
extends into the regular parlance of critical legal schol-
arship,30 a branch of legal studies that many identify as
being a derivative of the very legal realist tradition that
Cohen reflected. Yet, to borrow from Cohen’s words,
‘nobody has ever seen’ or touched an international legal
fragment since its ‘verifiable existence’ does not extend
beyond the mind of legal scholars. This leaves us to ask:
if not from nature or empirical observation, where does
such a belief or faith come from? How can one explain
the force of a spatial metaphor that has commanded the
recent conceptualisation of international legal space?
The above quoted passage from Cohen provides both an
important sociological clue and a methodological bridge
into the significance of Foucault’s archaeology: social
forces have always worked to shape our perception of
the law and, more specifically, our spatial understand-
ings and representations of it. Translated into a Fou-
27. M.J. Horowitz, The Transformation of American Law: The Crisis of
Legal Orthodoxy, 1870-1960 (1992), at 169.
28. F.S. Cohen, ‘Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach’,
35 Columbia Law Review 809 (1935). D. Kennedy and W.W. Fisher III,
The Canon of American Legal Thought (2006), at 176.
29. See Young, supra n. 8; A. Fisher-Lescano and G. Teubner, ‘Regime-
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of
Global Law’, 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 999 (2004);
J.P. Trachtman, ‘The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers,
Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Cooperation’, 13 Journal of Interna-
tional Economic Law 719 (2010); W.A. Schabas, ‘Synergy or Fragmen-
tation? International Criminal Law and the European Convention on
Human Rights’, 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 609 (2011).
30. M. Koskenniemi and P. Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law:
Postmodern Anxieties’? 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 553
(2002).
cauldian framework, the way in which fragmentation
presents international legal space rests upon a heritage
of deeper social assumptions and rules regarding the
nature of worldly space itself. Such assumptions and
rules require uncovering so as to more fully compre-
hend how it is that the metaphorical fragment has pene-
trated so ordinarily into the conceptual vocabulary and
spatial imaginations of lawyers. The poetry of Oliver
Wendell Holmes provides a lucid illustration:
The life of an individual is in many respects like a
child’s dissected map. If I could live a hundred years,
keeping my intelligence to the last, I feel as if I could
put the pieces together until they made a properly
connected whole. As it is, I, like all others, find a cer-
tain number of connected fragments, and a larger
number of disjointed pieces, which I in time place in
their natural connection. Many of these pieces seem
fragmentary, but would in time show themselves as
essential parts of the whole. What strikes me very
forcibly is the arbitrary and as it were accidental way
in which the lines of junction appear to run irregular-
ly among the fragments. With every decade I find
some new pieces coming into place. Blanks which
have been left in former years find their complement
among the undisturbed fragments. If I could look
back on the whole, as we look at the child’s map when
it is put together, I feel that I should have my whole
life intelligently laid out before me.31
3. Excavating the Fragment:
Cosmography, Absolute
Space and the Geometric
Conquest
For something to be thought or institutionalised as
knowledge, Foucault asserted, certain conditions for
that type of thought must already be in place.32 Put dif-
ferently, our conceptualisations of ‘the world’ at any his-
torical moment have always been defined by what Fou-
cault referred to as a pre-existing field of ‘the thinkable’
or an ‘episteme’33; which comprised unconscious rules
that made certain forms or structures of ‘order’ possible
– or powerfully intuitive – in a given cultural period and
at a given moment.34 What became crucial for Foucault,
thus, was the recognition that the types of thought we
produce are limited by underlying epistemological rules
of the thinkable.
This emphasis on rules of the thinkable becomes perti-
nent when excavating the fragment as a dominant spatial
31. Produced as the opening quotation to G. Greene, Journey Without
Maps (1980).
32. L. Downing, The Cambridge Introduction to Michel Foucault (2009), at
39.
33. Foucault, supra n. 15, at xxii.
34. Ibid., at xxi-xxiii.
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metaphor for law beyond the state. Notice how I did not
mention in the preceding sentence the terms interna-
tional, world or global? This omission is deliberate since
it is the metaphor of ‘the world’ or the globe as a whole
that constitutes a key underlying condition in both west-
ern modernity’s and, later, international law’s construal
of space. Specifically, I refer to western thought’s most
profound reification: the globalisation of space or, in
other words, the attachment of spatial comprehension to
an absolute and geometric globe. There are many layers
to the story of how western thought came to reduce the
notion of space to a geometric object. Since it is beyond
the confines of this present article to analyze each his-
torical layer in detail, I shall limit myself to summarise
key developments that I take as crucial for understand-
ing how a spatial view of fragments and wholes became
not only eminently ‘thinkable’ but also ‘natural’ for
much legal scholarship.
For many even in this postmodern time it remains diffi-
cult to conceive of space without reference to a geomet-
ric area. For instance, discussion on the impact of the
digital revolution, e.g. the internet, information technol-
ogy and high-speed transportation, despite lofty refer-
ences to infinite spatial possibilities or ‘de-territorialisa-
tion,’35 often loops back to the absolute metaphor of the
virtual ‘world’. Further, social comprehension of space
has not only been tied to a geometric representation but
also as something requiring translation and projection
onto the measurability of a planimetric map. Thus,
whether explicit or implicit, an underlying but no less
governing epistemology seems to be working to subtly
influence the presumed ‘order’ of what we think space
‘looks like’ in the absolute. Put within a Foucauldian
perspective, the intuition to reduce social space to a geo-
metric and planimetric ‘reality’, to figuratively ‘lay out
the world before us’ a la Holmes, appears to resemble
this subterranean condition for the ‘thinkable’. How
could this be so?
One way to better appreciate the contingent and cultur-
ally situated character of geometric and planimetric
‘reality’ is to consider alternate perceptions of space
both historically and conceptually. For instance, despite
the fact that modern accounts credit the Ancient
Greeks, and specifically Euclid, for a geometric under-
standing and representation of ‘space’, it is important to
underline that the Greeks in fact had no word that equat-
ed to the modern term ‘space’.36 Further, we should not
fall into the common habit of forgetting the sizable peri-
od of European Medieval history that preceded both the
Renaissance and Modernity. Heretofore, as Camille
notes, “there [was] no such thing as ‘space’ for medieval
35. G. Handl, ‘Extra-Territoriality and Transnational Legal Authority’, in
G. Handl, J. Zekoll and P. Zumbansen (eds.), Beyond Territoriality:
Transnational Legal Authoriy in an Age of Globalization (2012), at 3-4.
36. S. Elden, ‘Missing the Point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the
Space of the World’, 30 Transactions of the Institute of British Geogra-
phers, New Series 1 (2005), at 12.
people”37 as understood in the modern ‘global’ abstrac-
tion. Rather, the Medieval conceptualisation of space, as
Jens Bartelson explains, could be loosely translated as a
graphic and didactic ‘cosmography’ involving combina-
tions of the infinite and finite and, particularly, both a
bi-spherical cosmos and earth:
Medieval cosmology was based on a variety of sour-
ces, most of which distinguished between a celestial
and a terrestrial region. While the former embraced
everything from the moon to the limits of the uni-
verse, the latter included everything below the moon
to the centre of the earth.... According to Genesis I,
9, the terrestrial region was in turn divided into two
different zones, those of earth and water respectively.
These zones were mutually exclusive, so where there
was water, there could be no earth, and conversely.
From a biblical perspective, the ocean literally
marked the end of the known and inhabitable world.38
This is where the juxtaposition of the pre-modern and
modern becomes useful so as to underline the transfor-
mation that the latter made in the modern construal of
space: the equating of space and, consequently, spatial
representation with an object, or specifically a ‘single
sphere with one common centre of gravity’.39 The social
effect of this cosmological revolution cannot be overstat-
ed. Copernicus’ assertion of the rotunditate absoluta not
only established that the earth was one perfectly shaped
sphere, accessible to and appropriable for all European
powers, but also, by virtue of there being one solid geo-
graphical mass, implied that there could be an inherent
– i.e. divine – order to social space, which was similarly
unitary and absolute.40 Lost in this epochal transforma-
tion became the pre-modern appreciation of traditional
metaphysics and, in particular, the possibility of think-
ing about space(s) in terms of varied dimensions of
interrelated but no less categorically different images
and meanings of reality.
From Copernicus onward, space became equated as
absolute and whole, and this construction of ‘global’
space opened up a corresponding possibility for its divi-
sion or, to use a familiar metaphor, fragmentation.41
The Copernican revolution provided a new epistemo-
logical and ontological security via its ‘discovery’ of the
terraqueous globe, but this produced a different social
insecurity and thus imperative to order this newly con-
stituted space no longer bounded by cosmologically-
imposed barriers. Since the human ‘globe’ had unseated
the sublime cosmos, this now enabled a making of ‘the
world’ in the imagination of prevailing political agency.
37. M. Camille, ‘Signs of the city: place, power, and public fantasy in medi-
eval Paris’, in B.A. Hanawat and M. Kobialka (eds.), Medieval Practices
of Space (2000), at 9.
38. J. Bartelson, ‘The Social Construction of Globality’, 4 International Polit-
ical Sociology 3, at 223-224 (2010).
39. Ibid., at 225.
40. J. Klinghoffer, The Power of Projections: How Maps Reflect Global Pol-
itics and History (2006), at 75.
41. J.R. Short, Making Space: Revisioning the World, 1475-1600 (2004),
84-85.
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As Jerry Brotton explains, the race began to mould the
newborn globe via the appearance of appropriation or,
in other words, dividing the rotunditate absoluta via the
perceived ‘reality’ of cartographic bisection:
Maps, charts and globes such as the Cantino Plani-
sphere and Behaim’s terrestrial globe disseminated
vital conceptual information on the changing territo-
rial and commercial shape of the world they depicted.
Supplemented by the mass of travel narratives and
diplomatic reports which emerged ... such geographi-
cal artefacts became prized possessions, not only
keeping their owners informed of the latest discover-
ies and commercial ventures, but also providing them
with a sense of security as to their own identity with-
in such an ever-changing world. [...] [This] produc-
tion of maps and charts ... [became] the practical bed-
rock for all subsequent printed cartography over
much of the globe for the next 200 years....42
Yet, the aim of cartographic conquest soon encountered
a sizable epistemic problem, which became manifest
after the landmark Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494. The
Treaty drew a “straight line ... north and south ... from
pole to pole ... at a distance three hundred and seventy
leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands,”43 with the aim
of granting Portugal the eastern half (Africa) and Spain
the west (the Americas). However, it became discovered
that South America had an eastward curvature that
extended beyond the Tordesillas ‘line’, granting Portu-
gal the right to establish colonies in South America –
most notably what became known as Brazil.44 The ambi-
tion to appropriate an absolute ‘globe’ exceeded the pos-
sibilities of navigation and cartography at the time; but
in actuality, the problem had its roots in the limits of an
underlying knowledge upon which conquest cartogra-
phy ultimately rested: Euclidian geometry.
This set the stage for Descartes and his philosophical
interventions in the 17th century, which would push the
teleology of modern European thought toward a deci-
sively mathematical and analytical imperative. What
needs unearthing, therefore, are the epistemological
foundations supplied by Descartes’ intervention that
were to herald the scientific revolution in modern phi-
losophy and geometry; and how analytic geometry came
to the service of the modern state’s requisite of appro-
priating the notion of territory to represent its own
‘absolute’ existence. We briefly excavate each of these
complementary developments in turn.
As indicated earlier, the Ancient Greeks, and Euclid in
particular, are credited with the origin of geometry, and
much of what Euclid developed remains integral today.
Yet, Euclid’s contribution, however constitutive, had to
be reconciled with Copernicus’ discovery of an ‘abso-
42. J. Brotton, Trading Territories: Mapping the Early Modern World
(1997), at 75 and 83.
43. Treaty of Tordesillas, 7 June 1494 <www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
modeur/mod001.htm>, Clause 1 (accessed 2 November 2012).
44. R. Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (1986), at
131-132.
lute’ globe. Descartes’ philosophical interventions rep-
resented, in effect, the vanguard of such process of geo-
metric rejuvenation – a process later contributed to by
Spinoza, Leibniz, Newton and Kant.45 Foremost, Des-
cartes radically altered the ‘thinkable’ by, first, making a
pivotal separation between thought (res cogitans) and the
material world (res extensa),46 and in this way space
acquired a Cartesian identity as material and absolute,
independent of human thought and senses.47 Second,
flowing from this assertion, Descartes also held that the
material world (Cartesian space) was arithmetically
divisible and calculable,48 and this opened geometry to
an algebraic translation (analytical geometry) and appro-
priation by mathematics. As Stuart Elden describes,
Cartesian geometry overturned the age-old adherence to
Aristotle’s classical separation between geometry and
arithmetic:
For Aristotle, the key thing about the connectivity of
units is that they are discrete, separate from each oth-
er. A sequence of numbers, for example, has a dis-
tance between each of them, we count one after the
other, steps along the way. A line, in distinction,
while it has points within it, cannot simply be
reduced to a string of points. There is more to the
line, because the connection of points is different
from the sequence of numbers. Points, when they are
connected, literally have the end of one as the begin-
ning of the next, there is nothing between
them....Descartes [saw] geometry as equivalent of
algebra; it is the symbolic version of the world....Des-
cartes [saw] geometrical figures and, by extension,
the world of which they are symbols, as numerically
calculated.49
Thus, what Descartes made possible is what Lefebvre
refers to as the geometric ‘science of space,’50 where the
purpose and aims behind mapping shifted from the
graphics and didactics of cosmography to the mathemat-
ical precision needed for locating and asserting claims in
a geographic area. The Cartesian coordinates system
gave an analytical means to project the spherical globe
onto a flat surface and enable ‘an exhaustive geographi-
cal inventory’51; and such a geometric possibility came
into conjunction with a further transformation in 17th
century Europe: the gradual consolidation of the so-
called Westphalian States system.52 This Westphalian
order required that European monarchs demonstrate an
effective territorial sovereignty,53 and that entailed sys-
45. H. Lefebvre, The Production of Space (1984), at 1-2.
46. R. Descartes, Ouevres de Descartes, v. VII, C. Adam & P. Tannery (eds.)
(1964), at 85-86.
47. G. King, Mapping Reality: An Exploration of Cultural Cartographies
(1996), at 140.
48. Ibid.
49. Elden, supra n. 36, at 12.
50. Lefebvre, supra n. 45, at 3.
51. M. Escobar, ‘Exploration, Cartography and the Modernization of State
Power’, in N. Brenner et al. (eds.) State/Space: A Reader (2003), at 35.
52. See A. Ossiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations and the West-
phalian Myth’, 55 International Organization 251 (2001).
53. Escobar, supra n. 51.
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tematic knowledge and description of Crown lands in
order to establish a sovereign claim and taxation. In this
way, the confluence of Westphalian prerogative and
Cartesian geometry contributed to the construction of
geographical jurisdiction and, crucially, state power in
terms of measurable ownership of worldly space,54
which became expressed through the modern and statist
code of ‘territory’.
As a result, a ‘scientific’ cartography did emerge in the
17th and 18th centuries, under the eager patronage of
Baroque dynastic States, which advanced a range of
cadastral mapping, military surveys and longitude meas-
urement techniques55 to consolidate an absolute stake in
this evolving geographical world. Yet, despite the pro-
fessed and even apparent validity of such methods, the
genesis of this cartographic ‘science’ was foremost direct-
ed at bringing under control the geographical reality of
the globe through geometric representation,56 reduction
and the perfection of planimetric frontiers.57 In this
manner, a reduction of the globe to a geometric area
enabled the production of a state’s territory and thus
secured a state’s geographic claim – including prized
‘possessions’ – upon the rotunditate absoluta. Hence,
geometric representation and calculation had not only
tamed the prospects of yet another Tordesillas-like
blunder but in fact ushered a grander geometrisation of
the globe.58 It offered to replace the professed crudity of
‘natural’ boundaries for the symmetry and elegance of
linear borders and gridlines.
A ‘geometrically perfect world’ could now be construct-
ed as the Renaissance had once made ‘geometrically per-
fect towns’, ‘reflecting perfections of the universe and
the autonomy of intellect’.59 A view no doubt supported
by the establishment in 1659 of Europe’s first modern
and geometrically derived border through the Pyrenees.
The implications would become even more visible and
profound through time as planimetric reduction caught
up with the new colonial frontiers;60 foremost expressed
by the gridlines of latitude and longitude that parcelled
indigenous domains61 in both the continental United
States62 and Africa.63 In this way, modern geography
came to institute the stated perfection of geometric spa-
tiality and, simultaneously, exercise a symbolic – and
often ecological, physical and social – violence as dicta-
ted by the yardstick’s edge.
It was in this context of geographic conquest, territorial
control and spatial reductionism that the ‘science’ of
54. J. Black, Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past (1997), at
15.
55. Ibid., 14-16.
56. P. Virilio, L’Insecurite de Territoire (1975), at 120.
57. Black, supra n. 54, at 16-17.
58. King, supra n. 47, at 142.
59. A. Akkerman, ‘Urban Planning in the founding of Cartesian Thought’, 4
Philosophy and Geography 141, at 161 (2001).
60. Klinghoffer, supra n. 40, at 78-79.
61. We should not forget that part of the social violence of the colonial and
later imperial conquests was the imposition of colonial mapping over
indigenous mapping. See King, supra n. 47, at 142-144.
62. Sack, supra 44, at 127-168.
63. See M.W. Mutua, ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal
Inquiry’, 16 Michigan Journal of International Law 1113 (1995).
geometric and planimetric reality was born and nur-
tured, and from which ‘representational mapping’
derives to ‘intelligently lay before us’ the known world
as whole and constituent fragments. This brings us to an
important observation that flows from our attempted
archaeology: centuries of modern thought came to reify
a geometric language and ‘reality’ of worldly space, and
establish the planimetric map as a seemly iconic and
autonomous mode of representation which simply ‘mir-
rored nature’.64 By excavating various epistemological
and ontological layers that have constituted the geomet-
ric globe and space, the underside of that geometric idea
came into view with its historic attachment to the epis-
temic, imperial and political motivations of both ‘the
discovery’65 and modern state consolidation. This deep-
er purview exposed the naturalness of the geometric
world as a cultural and political production and, most
crucially, the legacy of power, conquest and domination
it came to encode and make obscure. To summarise
with the words of constructivist cartographer Brian
Harley, geometric space becomes laid before us in a dif-
ferent light as the product ‘not only of the rules of the
order of geometry and reason but also of the norms and
of ... the social forces that have structured...all map
knowledge’.66
4. Fragmentation Revisited:
A Legal Metaphor and an
Epistemic Legacy
This excavation has produced a fuller view of the histo-
ry and thought that encompasses international law’s
recent entanglement with geometric space as symbolised
through reference to the metaphorical fragment. Our
attempted archaeology of that geometric enterprise has
made possible an appreciation of how the fragment met-
aphor and narrative is rooted in and emerges from an
epochal history that international law is itself connected
to as a social outgrowth of modernity. Further, Foucaul-
dian archaeology becomes instructive for cautioning us
on how the embedding of geometric reality within the
rules of the epistemologically ‘thinkable’ generate a
seemingly passé and obscure heritage that falls from
contemporary legal view. In other words, after succes-
sive centuries of Cartesian conditioning, a ‘geometrically
perfect world’ appears simply a quaint and familiar way
of imagining and articulating ‘the world’ as it ‘is’ and
‘should be’.
It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the metaphorical
fragment has slipped so seamlessly into the mindset of
the contemporary discipline and profession, extending
even to those with a stated intention to overhaul the
64. Escobar, supra n. 51, at 47.
65. See also A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of Inter-
national Law (2004), at 13-31.
66. B. Harley, ‘Deconstructing the Map’, 26 Cartographica 1, at 2 (1989).
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‘gravity’ of (international) law beyond the state. Here,
Gunther Teubner’s pioneering piece on the ‘Global
Bukowina’67 becomes a salient example, where a forceful
argument on ‘global law’ as a ‘lived’, plural and sui gen-
eris legal order became flattened by its tie to a planimet-
ric metaphor (Bukowina) emanating from conquests of
the Hapsburg Empire.68 Further still, in Teubner’s later
collaboration with Fischer-Lescano,69 what began with a
strong caution against ‘legal reductionisms’ of global law
shifted to a narrative that invoked frames of turf-like
‘conflicts’, ‘collisions’ and ‘combat’; where in the same
breathe ‘fragmentation’ emerged as seemingly descriptive
language for the new mapping of:
Global legal pluralism… [which]…is not simply a
result of political pluralism, but is instead the expres-
sion of deep contradictions between colliding sectors
of a global society. At core, the fragmentation of
global law is not simply about legal norm collisions or
policy-conflicts, but rather has its origin in contradic-
tions between society-wide institutionalized rationali-
ties, which law cannot solve, but which demand a
new legal approach to colliding norms.70
Immediately, this focus on Teubner should be under-
stood as anything but capricious; rather it is insightful
for the profound tension it manifests between ontologi-
cal ambition versus epistemological heritage and schol-
arly agency versus epistemic structure. In fact, how the
above quote ends encapsulates what can be seen as an
irony: a ‘new approach’ is demanded for a problem pre-
cast to fit the ancien logic and mapping of fragmenta-
tion. In other words, the push for a new legal ontology
vis-à-vis ‘global law’, distinguished from the ‘interna-
tional’, became converted into a new geometric rational-
ity involving turf contests not between States but now
‘regimes’. Thus, while Teubner asserted the need for a
watershed articulation of an emerging ‘global law’, geo-
metric ‘reality’ translated and reprocessed that aspira-
tion into a familiar struggle over how to re-fragment
worldly space. Further, since the role of power and
domination had long been obscured from the notion of
‘representational mapping’, this shift from pluralism to
fragmentation could be understood as simply grounding
in the inherent geometry required of an absolute and
appropriable globe.
Yet, one should not lose sight of the epistemic conse-
quences that arise from this seemingly innocuous shuf-
fle of vocabularies. By virtue of an underlying geometric
epistemology, the plural, amorphous, and asymmetrical
legal practices that sparked Teubner’s drive to articulate
global law ‘in its own right’71 was compressed ontologi-
cally into a spatial scheme of fragmentation. It is impor-
67. G. Teubner, ‘“Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’,
in G. Teubner (ed.), Global Law without a State (1997), at 3.
68. For further discussion on the problem with the Bukowina metaphor,
see: F. Kratochwil, ‘Of Maps, Law, and Politics: An Inquiry into the
Changing Meaning of Territoriality’, DIIS Working Paper 2011:03.
69. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra n. 29.
70. Ibid., 1004.
71. Teubner, supra n. 67, at 4.
tant to remember that this flowed less from design than
the unconscious role geometric coding has played in
(post)modern spatial comprehension, whether political
or legal. In this way, Teubner’s global legal pluralism
required, as a rite of epistemic passage, some kind of
legal cartography – e.g. a ‘Bukowina’, where this ‘new
world’ of contradicting regimes and colliding sectors
could be ‘intelligently mapped before us’ like other
‘newfound’ worlds were before. This irrespective of the
fact that the contemporary instance of pluralism and
multiplicity could bring into question the very idea that
such loosely aligned worlds of diverse legal practices,
specialised institutions, varied practitioners, plural
norms and competing arguments were appropriately
reducible to something resembling a planimetric reality.
What emerges, therefore, is a lesser acknowledged but
nonetheless significant issue for disciplinary interna-
tional law: the extent to which the discourse of fragmen-
tation is an under scrutinised reification of the interna-
tional legal academy and profession. Such that those
which have adopted the seemingly neutral and descrip-
tive narrative of fragmentation – as ‘phenomenon’ –
could well be engaging, and unwittingly, in a normative
projection of ‘the way things are’, as James Boyle
reminds us:
[O]ne would have to ignore the central insight that
‘social constructs’, such as law, do not have some pre-
existing shape prior to human intervention. The idea
of finding the essence or the real sources of law dis-
tracts us from the reality that, in a very important
sense, it is being created by our categories and defini-
tions rather than being described by them.72
I want to pursue briefly two explanations that help us
parse the spectre of reification, which hangs over this
fragmentation narrative in international law. The first,
which is readily acknowledged by leading scholars, is
that reification is an actual and intentional part of the
politics of jostling international legal agendas. Potential-
ly rival international ‘regimes’, which Fischer-Lescano
and Teubner illustrate with reference to e.g. internation-
al human rights versus trade law tribunals,73 are foresee-
ably engaged in a struggle to assert and extend their
jurisdictional and substantive boundaries over as wide a
geometric area as possible, i.e. turf. In this way, our ear-
lier discussion of the geometric conquest provides a
suitable background on how the imagery of fragmenta-
tion translates the symbolic struggle to stake a perceived
(geometric) jurisdiction over an absolute globe. Thus,
reification becomes understood as an explicit or implicit
strategy of competing actors and regimes in their
attempt to ‘naturalise’ and thus extend preferred prac-
tices of ‘global’ authority.
Yet, we now arrive at the second and more critical
explanation vis-à-vis reification: the extent to which the
72. J. Boyle, ‘Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship and the Pris-
on-house of Language’, 26 Harvard International Law Journal 327, at
331-332 (1985).
73. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, supra n. 29, at 1000-1001.
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international legal world inhabits and operates an auton-
omous practice relative to the pretentions of science.
Here, we need to bring back a central contributor in the
fragmentation narrative, Martti Koskeniemmi, and his
recent argument, which attempts to demarcate interna-
tional law versus the other of the ‘theoretical sciences’:
Interdisciplinary vocabularies of ‘scholarship’ and
‘science’ miss what for most international lawyers is
the most obvious aspect of our trade: namely, its
craft-likeness, its being above all a practice. Interna-
tional law is not a social science. It is not a (theoreti-
cal) science at all – that is to say, it does not operate
on the basis of demonstrable, even less empirical
truths, nor with ideas about moral goodness. Legal
‘truth’ or ‘goodness’ is concerned with...the correct-
ness of the legal decision. This is a product of legal
practice, argument, persuasion, not its precondition.
Even as lawyers may use empirical arguments from
‘theory’ and sometimes invoke moral sentiments, the
practical reasoning – phronesis – that best character-
izes what lawyers do cannot be reduced to either one
or the other.74
Koskenniemi’s attempt to distinguish international law
from the social sciences is cause for both applause and
criticism. Regarding the former, his focus on what inter-
national lawyers do in relation to understanding rhetori-
cal practice, legal praxis and phronesis (practical reason)
injects sorely needed legal realism into social scientific
perspectives of what law ‘is’.75 Nonetheless, a concern
emerges on what appears to be a dichotomy Koskennie-
mi draws – at least implicitly – between law as ‘a prac-
tice’ and science as ‘theory’. At face value, the argument
is enticing because Koskenniemi buttresses the distinc-
tion by elevating a useful but often forgotten Aristoteli-
an metaphysics.76 However, the catch is that Koskennie-
mi frames Aristotle’s phronesis in a suggestively Cartesi-
an and geometric manner, because he subtly positions
the phronesis of international law in diametric contrast to
‘theoretical science’ – what Aristotle called episteme.77
Should his distinction between law and science indeed
rely upon Aristotle, it needs to be cautioned that Aristo-
tle had several ‘intellectual virtues’, including practical
reason, epistemic theory but also context, common
sense and intuition as well, and it is difficult to relate
these virtues in any persuasive symmetry. Thus, Aristo-
tle’s phronesis is a questionable foundation for an argu-
ment, which positions law (phronesis) and science (epis-
teme) with binary-like difference, since Aristotle’s
‘virtues’ had a more complex relationship.
74. Koskenniemi, supra n. 20, at 19.
75. See also the valuable discussion of K. Sideri: Law’s Practical Wisdom:
The Theory and Practice of Law Making in New Governance Structures
in the European Union (2007).
76. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics (1976).
77. For further discussion of the relationship between phronesis and epis-
teme, see N.M. Rajkovic, The Politics of International Law and Compli-
ance (2012), at 26-27; B. Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter
(2001).
However, this does not mean that Aristotelian metaphy-
sics is a spent flirtation for disciplinary international
law. Rather, the point is that reading phronesis with a
potential geometric impulse undermines the profundity
of what Aristotle actually imparted: an epistemic aware-
ness of there being a complex of different types of knowl-
edge. This insight is of significance vis-à-vis under-
standing how law and science are entwined via this
complex, and how the discourse of fragmentation in
international law is illustrative of that multifarious inter-
action. In sum, Koskeniemmi makes the astute point
that practical reasoning, interpretation, argument and
persuasion are all features which locate international law
at some distance from the more epistemic and universal-
ising orientations of many – but not all78 – social science
perspectives.79 However, there should be a caution
against construing such spacing with a geometry that
demarcates and fragments international law as a craft-
like ‘rhetorical practice’ versus ‘theoretical science’ as a
database for empirical truths. This is not a pedantic
concern in light of our discussion on how geometric sci-
ence and, specifically, how the ‘mapping’ of worldly
space as a fragmentary ensemble have come to naturalise
planimetric borders as being inherent for modern spatial
comprehension.
Put differently, we need to acknowledge ‘fragmentation’
for the imperial ambitions it has historically facilitated
vis-à-vis legitimating one’s geometric turf and domina-
tion; whether through tracts of earth claimed as ‘our
territory’, a family of notions asserted as under ‘our dis-
cipline’, or an expanse of population enrolled into the
values and norms of ‘our jurisdiction’. Geometrisation
has supplied not only an epistemic approach but also
teleology for modernity’s construal of the physical and
social world; slicing and dicing all manner of life ever
since Copernicus’ image of a finite globe seized social
or, more significantly, sovereign imaginations. This is
the story behind the fragment metaphor which incon-
spicuously ties international law to the legacies and trag-
edies of modern social geometry, and which needs tell-
ing to contemporary international lawyers immersed in a
fragmentation discourse with little epistemic notice or
excavation of that darker heritage.
78. See D. Della Porta and M. Keating (eds.), Approaches and Methodolo-
gies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective (2008). The recent
“practice” turn in disciplinary International Relations is one specific
example, see E. Adler and V. Pouliot (eds.), International Practices
(2011). See also F. Kratochwil, ‘Ten points to ponder about pragma-
tism: Some critical reflections on knowledge generation in the social sci-
ences’, in F. Kratochwil, The Puzzles of Politics: Inquiries into the Gene-
sis and Transformation of International Relations (2011), at 200-216.
79. For a discussion of science as a rhetorical practice, see B. Latour, Science
in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society
(1987).
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5. Conclusion: The Fragment as
the Metaphor of Domain
and not Deliberation
This brings us to concluding observations and questions
which emerge from our summary archaeology of the
fragment metaphor, and how they place a new light on
the established narrative of international law’s fragmen-
tation. Foremost, the metaphor should be seen for the
clever duality of meaning which it manifests. On the
surface, it engages an affective sense that suggests a ran-
dom breaking apart but, in deeper epistemological
terms, the metaphor is embedded within a layered lega-
cy of geometric, imperial and planimetric thought that
made ‘thinkable’ a carving up of an absolute globe in the
name of ‘science’ and at the service of power. Thus,
when lawyers articulate international law with reference
to fragmentation this must be attuned to the teleology
and conquest of geometrisation which has influenced
modern perceptions of what the political and legal world
should ‘look like’. What is more, the weight and force of
that geometric teleology cannot simply be effaced with
the nominal declaration of a new ‘postmodern’ and
counter-imperial mindset, which proclaims global
‘regimes’ to be the reproduction of a familiar fragmenta-
tion but only this time finessed by a ‘coherent legal-pro-
fessional technique’ into fragmentation light.
Further still, there is the mentality of this geometric
‘system of thought’ and how it conditions the way
agents (e.g. legal scholars, policy-makers) encounter,
translate and act upon perceived social space. Specifical-
ly, the cultural embedding of geometric ‘reality’ has
taught us the productive power of compressing the
social ‘world’ into a preferred ‘representational map’
and, correspondingly, the immense social power exer-
cised by those that can ‘fragment’ its imagined geomet-
ric area. When applied to expanding indeterminacies of
this latest80 instance of ‘globalisation’ and its subsequent
epistemic ‘crises’ provoked, lest we forget that the geo-
metric rationality behind fragmentation has always
expressed security and salvation as derivative of the
lines we draw to form quaint domains and borders.
Thus, a postmodern context characterised by assertions
of borderless ‘migration’, ‘hyper-connectivity’, ‘inter-
disciplinarity’, ‘trans-nationalism’, ‘global contagion’,
‘network terrorism’ and ‘cyber-criminality’ all seem to
trigger appeal for new ‘frontiers’ – some enforced by
‘unmanned’ drones81 – that retain their salience as indis-
pensable rationalities for distinguishing between ‘princi-
pled’ forms of us versus them.
This perpetuation of the asymmetry of power and wel-
fare is in fact the historic legacy and pathology of frag-
mentation; which makes it is difficult to speak of a legal-
80. See N. Chanda, “Runaway Globalization Without Governance”, 14
Global Governance 119 (2008).
81. See F. Sauer and N. Schornig, “Killer Drones: The ‘Silver Bullet’ of Dem-
ocratic Warfare?”, 43 Security Dialogue 363 (2012).
ly fragmented world now tameable82 by ‘debate and evi-
dence’ or to be resolved on the ‘merits’.83 It requires a
lens which sees how one billion ‘cyberfolk’ can appear
united in watching ‘Gangnam Style’ on YouTube while
at the same time pitted against one another in virtual
‘regime’ clashes over ‘fundamental’ rights and priorities
which produce – the lesser announced – impoverish-
ment or death of subset millions each year.84 In these
circumstances, the question of ‘who decides’85 increas-
ingly becomes a postscript when the cutting edge of
juridical techniques are focused upon defeating mean-
ingful jurisdiction that can be exerted to challenge the
geometric extension and influence of one’s normative
agenda and intended hegemony.86 To return back to our
introductory discussion, this is what makes the ILC
Report’s innocuous association between territorial and
‘regime’ fragmentation a pivotal turning point in the
narrative of fragmentation but no less contestable story-
telling; as it ignored the geometry of domination, which
has been a historical facet of the practice of fragmenta-
tion in international law and politics. It confused form
and substance and, more importantly, combined narra-
tive optimism with faith in juridical professionalism.
This repackages a legal pathology to adhere with what
arguably are subterranean attachments that some inter-
national lawyers have for the modern ‘grand narrative’
of enlightened progress, and it is lesser discussed but
equally affiliated conquests of geometric reason.
82. See F. Kratochwil, “Has the ‘rule of law’ become a ‘rule of lawyers’”?
An inquiry into the use and abuse of an ancient topos in contemporary
debates”, in Kratochwil, supra n. 78, at 126-150.
83. Koskenniemi and Leino, supra n. 30, at 578.
84. See T. Pogge, “Divided against Itself: Aspiration and reality of interna-
tional law”, in J. Crawford and M. Koskenniemi (eds.) The Cambridge
Companion to International Law (2012), at 373-398.
85. Koskenniemi, supra n. 20, at 20-21.
86. One example is the exploding number of bilateral investment treaties,
their subsequent inclusion into Free Trade Agreements, and how this
curtails possible interventions by national or even international adjudica-
tion. See J.W. Salacuse, “The Emerging Global Regime for Investment”,
51 Harvard International Law Journal 427 (2010); Asha Kaushal,
“Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash
Against the Foreign Investment Regime,” 50 Harvard International Law
Journal 491 (2009). Further, we cannot ignore the way in which “Sta-
tus of Forces Agreements” web together with an ever elaborating doc-
trine of self-defense to obscure jurisdiction over growing transnational
drone strikes. See J.J. Paust, “Civilian Casualties in Modern Warfare:
The Death of the Collateral Damage Rule”, 18 International and Com-
parative Law Quarterly 565 (2012); John Morrissey, “Liberal Lawfare
and Biopolitics: US Juridical Warfare in the War on Terror”, 16 Geopol-
itics 280 (2011).
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